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Abstract 
 
 
Several authors have recently advocated a so-called new case for paternalism, 
according to which empirical findings from distinct decision sciences provide 
compelling reasons in favour of paternalistic interference. In their view, the 
available behavioural and neuro-psychological findings enable paternalists to 
address traditional anti-paternalistic objections and reliably enhance the well-
being of their target agents. In this paper, I combine insights from decision-
making research, moral philosophy and evidence-based policy evaluation to 
assess the merits of this case. In particular, I articulate and defend three 
complementary arguments that, I claim, challenge even the best available calls 
for such case. In doing so, I identify the main justificatory challenges faced by 
the new paternalists and explicate the implications of these challenges for the 
ongoing philosophical debate about the justifiability of paternalistic 
interference. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In recent years, several authors have advocated a so-called new case for 
paternalism (henceforth, NCP), according to which empirical findings from 
distinct decision sciences provide compelling reasons in favour of paternalistic 
interference (see e.g. Hausman and Welch, 2010, and Rizzo and Whitman, 
2009a, for detailed reconstructions). The idea is that the available behavioural 
and neuro-psychological findings enable paternalists to address traditional anti-
paternalistic objections and reliably enhance the well-being of their target 
agents. Behavioural and neuro-psychological findings have been claimed to 
support paternalistic interference in a variety of domains, ranging from 
consumer choices to health care and reproductive decisions. These claims, in 
turn, prompted heated discussions regarding the justifiability of paternalism 
both in philosophy (see e.g. Bovens, 2009, and Carter, 2014) and in other 
disciplines (see e.g. Rubinstein and Arad, 2015, Sugden, 2008, and the special 
issue of this Journal, 2012, 38 (4), in economics; Glaeser, 2006, and Rachlinski, 
2003, in psychology; and Camerer, 2006, and Farah, 2012, in neuroscience). 
 
In this paper, I combine insights from decision-making research, moral 
philosophy and evidence-based policy evaluation to assess the merits of the 
NCP. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I identify and discuss three 
distinctive features of paternalistic interference. In Section 2, I reconstruct the 
NCP and explicate how recent behavioural and neuro-psychological findings 
supposedly support it. In Sections 3-5, I articulate and defend three 
complementary arguments that, I claim, challenge even the best available calls 
for the NCP. More specifically, the argument from conceptual ambiguity builds 
on major difficulties inherent in defining and measuring well-being to question 
the new paternalists’ ability to show that their interventions reliably enhance 
agents’ well-being. The argument from limited overlap points to the paucity of 
paternalistic interventions that reliably enhance agents’ well-being without 
involving morally objectionable violations of these agents’ autonomy or 
consent. The argument from constrained epistemic access aims to demonstrate 
that the new paternalists typically lack the information required to design and 
implement welfare-enhancing paternalistic interventions. These three 
arguments do not license all-encompassing opposition to paternalism. Still, 
taken together, they cast serious doubts on the new paternalists’ claim that 
recent findings from the decision sciences provide convincing reasons for 
paternalistic interference. 
 
The expression ‘new paternalism’ is often used to encompass a broad set of 
paternalistic proposals, including so-called asymmetric paternalism, which aims 
to enhance the well-being of ‘boundedly rational’ individuals while minimizing 
the welfare losses for ‘fully rational’ individuals (see e.g. Camerer et al., 2003), 
and libertarian paternalism, which aims to steer individuals’ behaviour in 
welfare-enhancing directions without restricting the range of options available 
to such individuals (see e.g. Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Below I adopt this 
entrenched use of the expression ‘new paternalism’ unless specified otherwise. 
My evaluation of the NCP aims to inform the contemporary discussion 
regarding the justifiability of paternalism in at least three respects of general 
interest to economists, philosophers and policy makers. First, it elucidates the 
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epistemic and evidential relevance of recent findings in economics, psychology 
and neuroscience for the ongoing philosophical debate about the justifiability of 
paternalistic interference. Second, it highlights in what respects the new 
paternalists improve over previous calls for paternalistic interference and 
explicates the main justificatory challenges faced by the NCP. And third, it 
brings together parallel debates that are insufficiently integrated across 
philosophy and specific decision sciences to develop a systematic appraisal of 
the NCP. In articulating this appraisal, I provide examples from a wide range of 
economic and policy contexts, as opposed to one single case study. I do so to 
make clear that my challenges apply not merely to a few selected paternalistic 
policies, but rather generalize across the new paternalists’ policy proposals. 
 
 
1. Paternalism: Distinctive Features 
 
 
The notion of paternalism has been given several characterizations by 
philosophers (see e.g. Arneson, 1980 and 2005, Feinberg, 1971 and 1986, ch.1, 
Dworkin, 1972 and 1983, and Shiffrin, 2000). I am not concerned here with 
assessing these characterizations or with proposing a novel characterization of 
paternalism. For the purpose of this paper, I employ the term ‘paternalistic’ to 
indicate interventions which: (1) violate (or interfere with) the autonomy of 
their target agents; (2) are implemented without the explicit consent of these 
agents; and (3) are designed with the primary aim to enhance the well-being of 
those agents. This characterization singles out three features as distinctive of 
paternalistic - as opposed to non-paternalistic - interventions. These features, in 
turn, are taken to constitute individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for regarding an intervention as paternalistic. A few clarifications 
about these three conditions are in order.1 
 
Concerning condition (1), paternalistic interventions greatly differ in the extent 
to which they violate the autonomy of their target agents (e.g. compare coercive 
detention with a mildly manipulative social advertising campaign). Indeed, 
some interventions involve such limited violations that one may question 
whether they are plausibly regarded as paternalistic (see e.g. Mitchell, 2005, on 
various forms of rational persuasion). Still, as I illustrate in Section 2, autonomy 
violations are one of the main reasons why paternalistic interventions are often 
deemed to be morally objectionable.2 As to condition (2), for an intervention to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Some authors put forward different characterizations of paternalism (e.g. Shiffrin, 
2000, holds that not all paternalistic interferences aim to enhance the well-being of the 
targeted agents, and Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, do not regard violations of agents’ 
autonomy as a necessary condition for counting interventions as paternalistic). Still, I 
take the tripartite characterization in the text to be sufficiently precise for the purpose 
of my evaluation and sufficiently general to cover many entrenched characterizations 
of paternalism (see e.g. Dworkin, 2010, New, 1999, and Wilson, 2011). 
2 I am not concerned with assessing how the notion of autonomy is most aptly 
conceptualized. For my evaluation, it suffices to note that many paternalists and anti-
paternalists alike hold that individuals have an interest in deliberating and acting in 
light of considered judgments about their own well-being, and that this interest is 
plausibly understood as an interest in autonomy (see e.g. Dworkin, 1988, ch.1, and 
Hausman and Welch, 2010). Some works relate paternalism to interventions that 
violate the freedom of choice (rather than the autonomy) of their target agents (see e.g. 
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qualify as paternalistic it is not required that its target agents actively oppose it. 
Rather, a lack of explicit consent by the time the intervention is implemented is 
sufficient to satisfy condition (2). This construal of condition (2) covers both 
cases where the target agents, unbeknown to the choice architects, express their 
consent to some other party, and cases where these agents do not consent but 
would have consented had they been better informed (hypothetical consent) or 
ideally rational (ideal consent).3 Finally, condition (3) relates paternalism to 
interventions that primarily aim to enhance their target agents’ well-being, as 
judged by the choice architects or by those agents themselves. Below I employ 
the expression ‘welfare-enhancing’ as a place-holder for different conceptions 
of well-being, without taking a position as to how exactly well-being should be 
defined and measured. In particular, I claim that an intervention is ‘welfare-
enhancing’ if it improves the well-being of its target agents with respect to an 
otherwise identical situation where such intervention is not implemented. This 
use of the expression ‘welfare-enhancing’ encompasses both situations where 
some other non-paternalistic intervention is implemented and situations where 
no other intervention is implemented. 
 
On the outlined construal of conditions (1)-(3), whether an intervention can 
qualify as paternalistic depends on whether such intervention is designed with 
the primary aim of enhancing the well-being of its target agents, not whether it 
succeeds in achieving this aim. That is to say, interventions that happen to make 
their target agents worse off can count as paternalistic if they were designed 
with the primary aim of benefiting those agents (see e.g. Bullock, 2015, on 
similar characterizations of paternalism). Moreover, interventions designed 
with additional aims besides that of enhancing agents’ well-being may still 
qualify as paternalistic (see e.g. Dworkin, 2005, on moral paternalism). 
Establishing whether enhancing agents’ well-being is the primary aim with 
which an intervention is designed is not always straightforward (e.g. policy 
interventions are often designed with multiple aims). However, this 
complication does not affect my evaluation, since most new paternalists 
emphasize welfare enhancement as the primary aim of the interventions they 
advocate (see e.g. Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, 1159; see also Diener and 
Seligman, 2004, 1-2, for the claim that well-being “ought to be the ultimate 
goal around which economic, health, and social policies are built”). 
 
 
2. The New Case for Paternalism 
 
 
The NCP draws on a wide array of recent behavioural and neuro-psychological 
findings. According to the new paternalists, these findings enable choice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Carter, 1999, ch.8, and 2014). I mention only autonomy in the text for expositional 
convenience. I take my critique of the NCP to hold mutatis mutandis for 
characterizations of paternalism that relate it to interventions that violate agents’ 
freedom of choice (rather than autonomy). 
3	   Several questions arise concerning the notion of consent (e.g. what circumstances 
license inferring that an agent consents to a particular interference? Under what 
conditions does consent count as fully informed or ideally rational?). I do not expand 
on these issues since the cogency of my evaluation does not rest on what position one 
holds about them (for a recent discussion, see e.g. Groll, 2012, and Husak, 2010). 
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architects to improve over former calls for paternalistic interference with regard 
to each of the three distinctive features outlined in Section 1. The idea is to 
build on the available evidence to implement paternalistic interventions which 
respectively (1) involve morally acceptable violations of (or interferences with) 
the autonomy of their target agents, (2) harmonize with these agents’ 
hypothetical or ideal consent, and (3) reliably enhance the well-being of those 
agents. Let us consider these three alleged improvements in turn.4 
 
(1) Autonomy-related concerns figure prominently in the writings of anti-
paternalists (see e.g. Kant, 1797 [1996], MM 6:453). One common theme in 
this literature is that even if individuals fail to make welfare-enhancing choices, 
the welfare losses they incur do not justify third parties’ interferences, for 
“autonomy is even more important than personal well-being” (Feinberg, 1986, 
59). To be sure, most anti-paternalists concede that some paternalistic 
interferences (e.g. primary schooling) involve morally acceptable violations of 
agents’ autonomy. In particular, few authors take any minor violation of 
autonomy to ipso facto make the associated paternalistic interferences 
unjustified. Still, autonomy violations are one of the main reasons why 
paternalistic interferences are often deemed to be morally objectionable. In the 
words of Velleman, “the reasons for deferring to a person’s judgment […] go 
beyond his reliability as a judge. Respect for a person’s autonomy may require 
that we defer to his considered judgment […] even when we have reason to 
regard that judgment as mistaken” (1999, 608; see Darwall, 2006, 280, for a 
similar remark).5 
 
The proponents of the NCP advocate a range of paternalistic interventions that 
putatively enhance agents’ well-being without involving morally objectionable 
violations of these agents’ autonomy. For example, Sunstein and Thaler (2003) 
support mandatory cooling-off periods that aim to benefit agents by inducing 
them to critically reconsider their own decisions. For his part, Cohen (2013) 
argues that so-called active choice, which requires agents to make a decision 
before a specified deadline, improves agents’ well-being in several 
circumstances (e.g. urgent decisions about medical treatment). In recent years, 
various authors have invoked autonomy-related concerns not so much against, 
but rather in favour of paternalistic interference. The idea is that autonomy 
involves not merely having one’s preferences protected from undesirable 
influences, but also being able to deliberate and act in light of considered 
judgments concerning one’s well-being (see e.g. De Marneffe, 2006). On this 
basis, some proponents of the NCP support paternalistic interventions that - 
while involving temporary violations of agents’ autonomy - counteract the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The new paternalists typically allege that the interventions they advocate are superior 
to traditional paternalistic interventions in each of these three respects, individually 
considered, but rarely examine how such interventions fare in all those respects, 
collectively considered. I explore this issue’s implications for the NCP in Section 4. 
5	  Anti-paternalists may draw on both deontological and consequentialist considerations 
to support these autonomy-related concerns. By way of illustration, suppose facing 
some agents engaged in self-regarding conduct that has no direct and significant effects 
on the well-being of others. A consequentialist may argue that since many agents value 
the opportunity to make autonomous decisions, and since giving agents opportunities 
they value often enhances their well-being, paternalistic interventions that frustrate this 
opportunity rarely turn out to be welfare-enhancing (see e.g. Sugden, 2004). 
	  
	  
6	  
influence of factors that purportedly impede autonomous decision-making. For 
instance, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, ch.2) advocate restricting the short-term 
range of options of specific classes of agents (e.g. addicts) on the alleged 
ground that doing so would safeguard or even promote these agents’ long-term 
autonomy.6 
 
(2) The mere fact that an agent does not explicitly consent to a particular 
intervention does not imply that such intervention violates her hypothetical or 
ideal consent. The new paternalists frequently advocate paternalistic 
interventions that, while operating without individuals’ explicit consent, 
putatively harmonize with their hypothetical or ideal consent (see e.g. Sunstein, 
2013a). The declared aim of these interventions is to help individuals to achieve 
their own considered goals without steering their behaviour towards 
predetermined outcomes (see e.g. Bar-Gill and Sunstein, 2015). Such 
paternalistic interventions are claimed to address or circumvent anti-
paternalistic concerns associated with violations of agents’ consent. To give one 
example, paternalists are often criticized for failing to respect the preferences of 
their target agents. Most of these criticisms implicitly presuppose that the 
involved agents possess well-defined preferences before facing specific 
decision problems. In many cases, however, people construct their preferences 
only when confronting such problems (see e.g. Guala, 2005). According to 
some authors (e.g. Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 1164), in these cases it is 
pointless to criticize paternalists for failing to respect agents’ preferences. For 
those agents lack well-defined preferences in the first place.7 
 
(3) As to the enhancement of agents’ well-being, the following reasoning is 
often put forward by the new paternalists (see e.g. Bhargava and Loewenstein, 
2015, and Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008). Paternalistic interference is 
commonly opposed on the alleged ground that individuals are better placed than 
third parties to determine what choices enhance their own well-being (see e.g. 
Mill, 1859 [1956], ch.3-4). Even so, individuals frequently fail to make welfare-
enhancing decisions. Moreover, several factors besides a lack of information 
regarding the available options can lead individuals to make choices that 
worsen (rather than enhance) their own well-being (see e.g. Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974, on cognitive biases, and Elster, 1984, part II, on self-control 
problems). Until recently, choice architects could influence only a narrow 
subset of these factors and had limited control over them. Fortunately - the 
reasoning goes - recent findings from the decision sciences enable choice 
architects to intervene on a wider range of factors and exert a more pervasive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Not all conceptions of autonomy are equally hospitable to these considerations. For 
instance, some Kantians would presumably object that autonomous agency cannot be 
subjected to the instrumental considerations seemingly involved in the aforementioned 
intertemporal trade-offs. I expand in Section 4 on the justificatory challenges that 
violations of autonomy pose to the NCP. 
7 This obviously does not preclude one from opposing such interventions on other 
grounds. For instance, one may act on preferences that are not stable under reflection, 
be aware that her preferences are unstable, and yet attribute a high importance to the 
opportunity to satisfy her unstable preferences (see e.g. Sugden, 2006 and 2007). 
Furthermore, many individuals have strong preferences against having their 
preference-formation mechanisms influenced by third parties’ interference, and the 
new paternalists’ interventions often frustrate such preferences (see e.g. Sugden, 2013). 
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control over them. This, in turn, provides choice architects with the means to 
design and implement paternalistic interventions that reliably enhance well-
being both across agents and across tokens of interventions of the same type. 
 
Two kinds of contributions appear to be particularly significant in this context. 
The first relates to the new paternalists’ attempts to improve individuals’ well-
being by exploiting specific biases and behavioural regularities. For instance, 
so-called save more tomorrow plans can noticeably increase employees’ 
savings for retirement by changing their default options in retirement saving 
decisions. These interventions exploit individuals’ status quo bias and do not 
restrict the set of options available to them (see e.g. Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
The second kind of contributions concern the use of neurochemicals and 
hormones to alter agents’ behaviour. The goal is to identify how specific neuro-
physiological perturbations affect decisions in particular experimental settings 
and use this information to influence individuals’ decisions in real-life 
situations. For example, various studies (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2008, and 
Kosfeld et al., 2005) document that modulating individuals’ oxytocin levels can 
significantly increase their propensity to trust other players in experimental 
settings where cooperative behaviour is deemed to be welfare-enhancing. 
Whether the interventions based on these studies qualify as paternalistic would 
depend on whether such interventions violate the autonomy and the consent of 
the targeted agents (see Section 1). Still, those studies provide a nice illustration 
of how recent neuro-psychological findings may help paternalists to foster 
welfare-enhancing modifications in agents’ behaviour. As Farah puts it, “[in] 
education, business, politics, law [...] any endeavor that depends on being able 
to […] improve human behavior is, in principle, a potential application area for 
neuroscience” (2012, 57). 
 
 
3. Argument from Conceptual Ambiguity 
 
 
As outlined in the previous section, the NCP is premised on the assumption that 
the new paternalists’ interventions reliably enhance the well-being of their 
target agents. In this section, I articulate and defend an argument from 
conceptual ambiguity that questions the new paternalists’ ability to substantiate 
this assumption. My argument goes as follows. In the behavioural and neuro-
psychological literature, different methods have been developed for measuring 
well-being (see e.g. Hausman, 2012, ch.7-8, and Rubinstein and Salant, 2012). 
Moreover, dissimilar conceptions of well-being have been proposed (see e.g. 
Griffin, 1986, and Parfit, 1984, 493-502, for an entrenched tripartition between 
mental state conceptions, preference satisfaction conceptions and objective list 
conceptions). The new paternalists advocate dissimilar measures and 
conceptions of well-being (see e.g. Le Grand and New, 2015, and White, 2013). 
This holds not just for different authors, but also for different works by the 
same authors (see e.g. Qizilbash, 2012, on distinct variants of preference 
satisfaction conceptions advocated by Sunstein and Thaler) and at times even 
for one and the same work (see e.g. Sunstein, 2013b, 1862, who uses ‘welfare’ 
to indicate both “whatever choosers think would make their lives go well” and 
“whatever the paternalist thinks would make choosers’ lives go well”). These 
divergences make it hard to assess the welfare implications of paternalistic 
interference. In particular, they cast doubt on the new paternalists’ claim that 
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their interventions reliably enhance agents’ well-being. For in many cases, 
whether or not paternalistic interference can be plausibly taken to enhance 
agents’ well-being crucially depends on what conception of well-being one 
endorses and on what methods one employs to measure well-being. 
 
To illustrate this, let us consider the entrenched tripartition between mental state 
conceptions, preference satisfaction conceptions and objective list conceptions 
of well-being. Mental state conceptions hold that well-being consists in the 
presence of specific kinds of mental states (see e.g. Crisp, 2006, and Feldman, 
1997, on hedonistic conceptions). Preference satisfaction conceptions, instead, 
hold that an agent is well off to the extent that her actual, informed or ideal 
preferences are satisfied (see e.g. Hausman and McPherson, 2009, and Sumner, 
1995). An agent’s preferences count as satisfied when the state of affairs with 
which these preferences are concerned obtains. The actualization of this state of 
affairs, in turn, does not have to involve any psychological feeling or 
experience of satisfaction on the part of the agent, and may even obtain without 
the agent being aware of such actualization (see e.g. Hausman, 2011). Still 
differently, objective list conceptions hold that certain goods or experiences 
contribute to an agent’s well-being regardless of whether they bring about 
particular mental states or satisfy the agent’s preferences (see e.g. Nussbaum 
and Sen, 1993). To be sure, various objective list conceptions allow that 
experiencing specific mental states and satisfying particular preferences may 
contribute to well-being. However, on objective list conceptions, an agent’s 
well-being is not determined solely by the agent’s own mental states and 
preferences (see e.g. Hausman, 2010). 
 
These three sets of conceptions occasionally yield consistent verdicts as to 
whether specific types of paternalistic interference are welfare-enhancing (e.g. 
think of primary schooling). Nonetheless, the new paternalists’ reliance on 
dissimilar conceptions of well-being poses a severe justificatory challenge to 
the NCP. For in many cases, different conceptions license conflicting 
evaluations of the welfare implications of paternalistic interference (see e.g. 
Griffin, 1986, on conflicts between mental state conceptions and objective list 
conceptions; Arneson, 1999, on conflicts between preference satisfaction 
conceptions and objective list conceptions; and XXX on conflicts between 
mental state conceptions and preference satisfaction conceptions). Indeed, such 
conflicts can occur even with distinct variants of the same conception (see e.g. 
Zamir, 1998, on how different sets of paternalistic interventions can be 
plausibly taken to make agents better off depending on whether one endorses an 
actual - as opposed to ideal - preference satisfaction conception of well-being). 
In this respect, it is telling that distinct authors’ positions regarding the 
justifiability of paternalism frequently vary with what conceptions of well-
being they endorse (e.g. think of many economists’ anti-paternalism and their 
reliance on actual or informed preference satisfaction conceptions of well-
being). 
 
A proponent of the NCP may object that the new paternalists’ reliance on 
dissimilar conceptions of well-being constitutes an unproblematic or even 
welcome indication of pluralism on their part (see e.g. Thaler and Sunstein, 
2003). After all - the thought would be - there is widespread disagreement about 
the relative merits of distinct conceptions, and it would be unnecessarily 
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demanding to require the new paternalists to agree on a single conception of 
well-being. This objection provides little support to the NCP. For in many cases 
where distinct conceptions of well-being yield consistent verdicts concerning 
the welfare implications of paternalistic interference, these conceptions ground 
such verdicts on rather different justificatory principles. These differences, in 
turn, can significantly constrain the robustness of the new paternalists’ 
agreement regarding the welfare implications of interventions that target 
diverse classes of agents and choice situations. Indeed, such differences may 
constrain not just the robustness, but also the informativeness of the new 
paternalists’ agreement regarding the welfare implications of their 
interventions. To see this, consider the ongoing debate concerning the 
informativeness of distinct indicators of well-being (see e.g. XXX). Several 
authors take observed correlations between putative indicators of well-being 
(e.g. hedonic reports, neuro-biological variables) to show that these indicators 
provide accurate and reliable measures of well-being. Those correlations may 
well suggest that the indicators at hand target some common variable, yet do 
not demonstrate that such indicators provide accurate and reliable measures of 
well-being (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009). 
 
A proponent of the NCP may further object that the previous remarks do not 
support selective anti-paternalism, since they apply to most interventions aimed 
at improving agents’ well-being irrespective of whether these interventions 
qualify as paternalistic (see e.g. Sunstein, 2015). The idea would be that the 
divergences between distinct conceptions of well-being make it difficult to 
reach agreement on the welfare implications of several interventions, 
independently of whether these interventions are paternalistic. This objection 
invites the following two-fold rejoinder. First, the mere fact that paternalistic 
and non-paternalistic interventions face some common justificatory concerns 
does not exempt paternalists from the need to address these concerns (see e.g. 
Section 5 on various cases where agents’ self-regulatory efforts have better 
welfare implications than both paternalistic and non-paternalistic interventions). 
And second, several justificatory concerns support selective anti-paternalism, 
since they predominantly challenge paternalistic - as opposed to non-
paternalistic - attempts to enhance agents’ well-being. I shall expand in Sections 
4 and 5 on these justificatory concerns. For the purpose of this section, I outline 
some difficulties inherent in establishing whether paternalistic interference 
reliably yields welfare benefits to its target agents. 
 
In recent years, the new paternalists have offered various criteria for 
establishing whether paternalistic interference yields welfare benefits to its 
target agents. For instance, as noted by Thaler and Sunstein (2008, ch.4), 
paternalistic interference is likely to be welfare-enhancing in situations where 
individuals obtain delayed and limited feedbacks concerning their choices’ 
welfare implications. Unfortunately, these criteria are set at an exceedingly high 
level of abstraction to enable the new paternalists to show that the interventions 
they advocate reliably yield welfare benefits to their target agents. To illustrate 
this, consider the new paternalists’ claim that one can establish whether their 
interventions are welfare-enhancing by examining aggregate data (see e.g. Bar-
Gill and Sunstein, 2015) and the hypothetical decisions that the majority of 
agents would presumably make if explicit choices were required (see e.g. 
Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). These data rarely provide precise indications 
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concerning the welfare implications of the new paternalists’ interventions 
across individuals and choice situations. For instance, consider the so-called 
endowment effect, i.e. individuals’ tendency to value specific goods more if 
they are given initial ownership of such goods. As acknowledged by Jolls and 
Sunstein (2006, 220), several factors may lead to differences between 
individuals’ willingness to accept and willingness to pay, with controversial 
axiological assumptions being required to establish whether these differences 
constitute errors in need of correction and, if so, how to correct such 
differences. 
 
To give another example, take the new paternalists’ declared aim to steer 
agents’ behaviour towards the choices these agents would make “if they had 
complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control” 
(Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, 1162, italics added). Achieving this aim would 
require the new paternalists to identify precisely what choices the targeted 
agents would make under these ideal conditions. This identification exercise, in 
turn, faces three major difficulties. First, it is hard to establish what exactly 
agents’ complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and perfect 
willpower amount to unless one makes substantive assumptions about well-
being (e.g. what information is deemed to be relevant in a given decision 
context can vary remarkably depending on what conception of well-being one 
endorses). Second, it remains obscure on what evidential and epistemic basis 
the new paternalists are to identify what the targeted agents would choose under 
ideal conditions. To be sure, various methods have been developed to 
reconstruct what preferences agents would exhibit if they had complete 
information and were free of reasoning imperfections (see e.g. Bernheim and 
Rangel, 2007, and Salant and Rubinstein, 2008). Yet, these methods yield 
informative welfare rankings only in choice situations where agents can be 
plausibly assumed to possess latent preferences that satisfy standard 
consistency principles (e.g. context independence), and it is dubious that agents 
generally possess such preferences (see e.g. Infante et al., 2016). And third, 
there is no guarantee that the latent preferences thus reconstructed provide 
reliable insights concerning agents’ well-being. As Hausman puts it, “it is one 
thing to determine what people’s preferences would be if they had [complete 
information] and were free of [reasoning imperfections], and it is a different 
thing to determine what is good for people” (2016, 30). 
 
These difficulties do not prevent the new paternalists from developing 
increasingly precise criteria for evaluating the welfare implications of their 
interventions. Even so, the new paternalists’ attempts to specify criteria that are 
sufficiently precise to provide choice architects with informative practical 
guidance are vulnerable to severe objections. By way of illustration, consider 
Sunstein and Thaler’s (2003) presumption in favour of policies that minimize 
the number of opt-outs. The mere fact that some policy minimizes the number 
of opt-outs by no means implies that this policy enhances the well-being of its 
target agents. For the number of opt-outs associated with that policy may vary 
depending on several factors that are unrelated to the welfare implications of 
such policy. For example, the mere fact that the rate at which adolescents start 
smoking nicotine is higher than the rate at which smokers of the same age quit 
falls short of implying that smoking enhances adolescents’ well-being. For this 
behavioural pattern more plausibly results from nicotine’s addictive properties 
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than from the alleged fact that smoking enhances adolescents’ well-being (see 
e.g. Sugden, 2008). Moreover, paternalistic interventions often contribute to 
determining what choices are subsequently made by their target agents, leading 
these agents to make rather different choices than the ones they would have 
made in the absence of such interventions (see e.g. Archard, 1993). In these 
situations, the observed number of opt-outs is more aptly regarded as a 
byproduct of paternalistic interference than as a reliable source of evidence 
regarding the welfare implications of such interference. 
 
To recapitulate, the empirical findings collected in distinct decision sciences 
document individuals’ widespread failures to make welfare-enhancing 
decisions, and enable the new paternalists to effect significant changes in 
individuals’ behaviour. Nonetheless, showing that particular paternalistic 
interventions are welfare-enhancing typically requires one to discriminate 
between different conceptions of well-being, or at least provide precise and 
plausible criteria for evaluating the welfare implications of such interventions. 
In this critical respect, even the best available calls for the NCP remain 
grounded in exceedingly vague conceptualizations of welfare to provide choice 
architects with informative practical guidance. 
 
 
4. Argument from Limited Overlap 
 
 
According to the NCP, recent behavioural and neuro-psychological findings 
enable choice architects to implement paternalistic interventions which 
respectively (1) involve morally acceptable violations of (or interferences with) 
the autonomy of their target agents, (2) harmonize with these agents’ 
hypothetical or ideal consent, and (3) reliably enhance the well-being of those 
agents (see Section 2). My argument from limited overlap questions the 
significance of these putative improvements for the merits of the NCP. The 
argument proceeds as follows. 
 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the available behavioural and neuro-
psychological findings help the new paternalists to implement paternalistic 
interventions that respectively satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3), individually 
considered. This by no means implies that these paternalistic interventions 
satisfy all those three conditions, collectively considered. For there is no general 
reason to assume that the sets of paternalistic interventions that respectively 
satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3) overlap to a significant extent. Now, showing 
that some paternalistic intervention is justified would typically require the new 
paternalists to demonstrate that this intervention satisfies conditions (1)-(3), 
collectively considered. After all, it would be of limited import to demonstrate 
that a paternalistic intervention enhances agents’ well-being, if this intervention 
succeeds in doing so only by means of morally unacceptable violations of these 
agents’ autonomy or consent. Conversely, it would hardly help the new 
paternalists to show that a paternalistic intervention involves morally acceptable 
violations of agents’ autonomy and consent, if this intervention fails to reliably 
improve the well-being of these agents. Unfortunately, only a few paternalistic 
interventions are shown to satisfy conditions (1)-(3), collectively considered. 
This, in turn, casts doubt on the merits of the NCP. Let me explicate this point. 
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Most of the policy interventions advocated by the new paternalists face the 
following dilemma. On the one hand, several paternalistic interventions involve 
morally acceptable violations of their target agents’ autonomy (condition 1) and 
consent (condition 2), but do not reliably enhance these agents’ well-being 
(condition 3). On the other hand, other paternalistic interventions reliably 
enhance their target agents’ well-being (condition 3), but succeed in doing so 
only because they involve morally objectionable violations of these agents’ 
autonomy (condition 1) and/or consent (condition 2). This dilemma affects not 
just a few paternalistic interventions, but also paradigmatic types of 
paternalistic interference championed by many new paternalists. By way of 
illustration, let us consider the interventions advocated by prominent libertarian 
paternalists. Libertarian paternalists declaredly aim to alter their target agents’ 
behaviour so as to “make [these agents] better off, as judged by themselves” 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, 5). The thought is that while traditional paternalists 
influence agents by means such as manipulation and deception, libertarian 
paternalists help individuals to make welfare-enhancing choices without 
restricting the range of options available to them (see e.g. Sunstein and Thaler, 
2003, on interventions that allow their target agents to opt out of automatic 
enrolments and discard the proposed default options). At first glance, the aim to 
make agents better off as judged by themselves without restricting the range of 
options available to them may seem an attractive policy ideal. Even so, the 
libertarian paternalists’ attempts to implement interventions that respect this 
ideal raise at least two major concerns. 
 
First, the mere fact that some paternalistic intervention does not restrict the 
range of options available to its target agents falls short of indicating that such 
intervention involves no morally objectionable violation of autonomy or 
consent (e.g. think of subliminal advertising and other forms of psychological 
manipulation). And second, choice architects’ ability to influence agents’ 
behaviour tends to significantly decrease when these agents are previously 
informed of the implementation of paternalistic interference and the cognitive 
mechanisms it exploits (see e.g. Bovens, 2009, and White, 2013, ch.4-5, for 
illustrations). Whenever this is the case, a tension arises between the choice 
architects’ aim to enhance agents’ well-being and their purported moral 
obligation to inform such agents of the implementation of paternalistic 
interference and the cognitive mechanisms it exploits. In such situations, 
libertarian paternalists rarely inform the targeted agents of what cognitive 
mechanisms are used to influence their behaviour and how exactly those 
mechanisms supposedly exert such influence (see e.g. Le Grand and New, 
2015, ch.6-7). To see this, consider again the ‘save more tomorrow’ plans 
mentioned in Section 2. These interventions do not engage their target agents in 
a process of rational persuasion, but influence their choices by surreptitiously 
exploiting decision biases (e.g. status quo bias) to which they are likely 
vulnerable. In this respect, it is telling that leading libertarian paternalists 
contend that in many cases a choice architect should “make the choices that she 
thinks would make the [agents] best off” (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, 1164) and 
“it may be desirable to impose [delegation] to protect naıve individuals who are 
unaware of their imperfect rationality” (Bar-Gill and Sunstein, 2015, 10).  
 
A proponent of the NCP may reply that choice architects often inform the 
targeted agents of the implementation of paternalistic interference (Loewenstein 
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et al., 2015), and that providing this information suffices to satisfy basic 
transparency constraints (see e.g. Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, 244, on the so-
called publicity principle, which bans governments from selecting policies that 
they would not be able or willing to defend publicly to their own citizens). 
However, the new paternalists have hitherto failed to precisely demarcate the 
set of interferences compatible with their transparency constraints (see e.g. 
Wilkinson, 2013, on Thaler and Sunstein’s publicity principle). Moreover, 
informing the targeted agents of the implementation of paternalistic interference 
does not per se address the justificatory concerns related to the limited 
transparency of the new paternalists’ interventions. To give one example, 
libertarian paternalists likely alter their target agents’ behaviour in ways that 
elude these agents’ awareness when they refrain from disclosing to those agents 
what cognitive mechanisms are employed to influence their behaviour and how 
these mechanisms supposedly exert such influence (see e.g. Felsen et al., 2013). 
Many agents, in turn, regard this kind of interference as more objectionable 
than paternalistic interventions that target conscious processes (see e.g. 
Rubinstein and Arad, 2015). In this perspective, several instances of libertarian 
paternalism resemble traditional paternalistic interventions in their tendency to 
substitute the choice architects’ evaluations for the target agents’ judgments 
about their own well-being.8 
 
To be sure, many paternalists and anti-paternalists alike agree that if an 
intervention makes its target agents better off, then this fact should be regarded 
as a prima facie (albeit defeasible) reason in favour of this intervention. 
Moreover, few authors regard the mere fact that a paternalistic intervention 
involves some minor violation of autonomy or consent as a sufficient reason to 
oppose such intervention (see Section 2). Even so, paternalists and anti-
paternalists respectively advocate rather dissimilar positions as to under what 
circumstances the welfare benefits yielded by paternalistic interference may 
justify such interference (e.g. are autonomy and consent just one among many 
factors pertaining to the evaluation of paternalistic interventions, or should they 
be regarded as a general constraint on the set of admissible interventions?).9 
Furthermore, the new paternalists have not specified precise and plausible 
criteria for assessing when exactly these welfare benefits can be taken to 
override the moral concerns associated with violations of autonomy and 
consent. This lack of specificity is problematic, since violations of autonomy 
and consent pose remarkable justificatory challenges to the new paternalists. 
Let me expand on this issue. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Similar concerns arise in relation to the possibility that paternalistic interference may 
lead to agents’ infantilization. The idea is that paternalistic interventions neither help 
nor incentivize their target agents to develop effective decision-making skills and make 
welfare-enhancing decisions for themselves (see e.g. Bovens, 2009). 
9 A new paternalist might object that if some paternalistic intervention is welfare-
enhancing, then such intervention is ipso facto justified. However, this objection 
presupposes that the welfare implications of paternalistic interference include all the 
factors pertaining to the justifiability of such interference, and the new paternalists 
have not offered convincing support to this welfarist presupposition (see e.g. Kagan, 
1992, and Sobel, 1998, for a discussion of the role autonomy considerations can be 
taken to play in the definition and measurement of well-being). 
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Most new paternalists acknowledge that violations of autonomy and consent 
may raise significant concerns about the justifiability of paternalism. Indeed, as 
noted in Section 2, several authors emphasize these concerns in highlighting the 
alleged superiority of the NCP over former calls in favour of paternalism. In 
this context, showing that choice architects should implement a given 
paternalistic intervention would require one to show that such intervention does 
not involve morally objectionable violations of its target agents’ autonomy or 
consent and has better expected welfare implications than non-paternalistic 
alternatives, i.e. likely enhances its target agents’ well-being with respect to 
situations where some alternative non-paternalistic intervention is implemented 
and situations where no other intervention is implemented. Regrettably, the new 
paternalists rarely attempt to meet this justificatory challenge. Moreover, the 
epistemic and evidential concerns I explicate in the next section make it highly 
doubtful that the new paternalists’ interventions have better expected welfare 
implications than non-paternalistic alternatives. 
 
  
5. Argument from Constrained Epistemic Access 
 
 
In this section, I articulate and defend an argument from constrained epistemic 
access which aims to demonstrate that the new paternalists typically lack the 
information required to design and implement welfare-enhancing paternalistic 
interventions. If correct, this argument poses a major justificatory challenge to 
the NCP, since the NCP crucially rests on the assumption that the new 
paternalists’ interventions reliably enhance the well-being of their target agents 
(see Section 2). The argument points to some major epistemic and evidential 
concerns that make it difficult for the new paternalists to accurately: (1) 
quantify the impact specific decision biases and limitations have on agents’ 
behaviour; (2) calibrate their interventions for the interactions between these 
biases and limitations; (3) anticipate how responsive such biases and limitations 
will be to their interventions; and (4) estimate the effects of agents’ self-
regulative efforts on their own behaviour. These concerns do not exclude that 
the new paternalists might occasionally obtain the information required to 
design and implement welfare-enhancing paternalistic interventions. Still, taken 
together, they give powerful reasons to think that the new paternalists rarely 
possess such information and will not obtain it in the near future. Below I 
examine these epistemic and evidential concerns in turn and support my 
critique with a series of examples from economic and policy contexts. Some of 
those concerns affect both paternalistic and non-paternalistic attempts to 
enhance agents’ well-being. Others, instead, prevalently challenge paternalistic 
interventions and single out paternalistic - as opposed to non-paternalistic - 
interventions as especially problematic.10 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Other authors (e.g. Glaeser, 2006, and Rizzo and Whitman, 2009b) put forward 
epistemic and evidential criticisms of the NCP. My remarks agree with these 
informative criticisms in spirit, but are grounded in a different conceptualization of 
paternalism and do not imply that the information required to implement welfare-
enhancing interventions is “in principle” unavailable to paternalists (Rizzo and 
Whitman, 2009b, 159).	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(1) As noted in Section 1, individuals are subject to a variety of decision biases 
and limitations. The new paternalists could in principle design welfare-
enhancing interventions without having accurate knowledge of the impact that 
these biases and limitations have on agents’ behaviour (e.g. think of cases 
where different biases offset each other). Even so, implementing welfare-
enhancing paternalistic interventions usually requires one to identify not just 
which biases and limitations affect her target agents, but also what impact such 
biases and limitations have on those agents’ behaviour. For the impact of 
specific biases and limitations varies significantly across agents (see e.g. Barber 
and Odean, 2001, on overconfidence), periods (see e.g. Baumeister, 2002, on 
self-control problems), and choice situations (see e.g. Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988, on the status-quo bias). Due to these variations, showing that 
a paternalistic intervention improves agents’ well-being in a particular 
experimental setting by no means guarantees that the same holds across agents 
and situations. Conversely, demonstrating that some paternalistic intervention is 
welfare-enhancing in most situations of a given type (e.g. retirement saving 
decisions) does not license the claim that such intervention is welfare-
enhancing in all (or even most) token situations of such type. For the welfare 
implications of paternalistic interference may vary dramatically due to minor 
alterations in the distribution of specific biases in the target population. The 
following example, which concerns how optimal sin taxes may vary depending 
on the distribution of self-control problems, nicely illustrates this point. 
 
Several authors advocate imposing so-called sin taxes that counteract 
individuals’ vulnerability to present-bias and lack of willpower. O’Donoghue 
and Rabin (2006) propose a model where individuals choose between a 
composite good and a ‘sin good’ that is enjoyable to consume, but yields health 
costs or other negative consequences in the future (e.g. think of cigarettes and 
fatty foods). O’Donoghue and Rabin investigate how the optimal level of sin 
tax varies depending on the values of various parameters, including the 
elasticity of demand for the targeted goods, the marginal health costs associated 
with these goods’ consumption, and the distribution of self-control problems in 
the targeted population. Let us focus on the last parameter. As illustrated by 
O’Donoghue and Rabin’s numerical examples (2006, 1836-9), minor variations 
in the distribution of self-control problems can have a dramatic effect on the 
optimal level of sin tax (e.g. marginal increases in agents’ present-bias can lead 
to an increase of the optimal tax level from 5% to 63% approximately). This, in 
turn, is problematic because the new paternalists often lack the means to 
accurately estimate the distribution of self-control problems in the population 
segments they target. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the 
distribution of self-control problems has been shown to vary both across 
individuals and across different sin goods (see e.g. Rizzo and Whitman, 2009b). 
 
(2) The empirical findings collected in distinct decision sciences document that 
individuals’ behaviour is often influenced by a number of biases and limitations 
simultaneously. The new paternalists can occasionally exploit these influences 
to steer agents’ behaviour in welfare-enhancing directions. For instance, as 
shown by Jolls and Sunstein (2006), one may use the availability heuristic - 
which inclines one to judge events as more probable when they can be called to 
mind more easily - to make negative outcomes more salient and thereby 
counteract agents’ optimism bias. At the same time, individuals’ vulnerability 
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to multiple biases and limitations can severely complicate the task of estimating 
the welfare implications of paternalistic interference. For biases and limitations 
interact in dissimilar ways (e.g. by reinforcing and offsetting each other) across 
agents and choice situations. Hence, paternalistic interventions that correct only 
some of their target agents’ biases can significantly worsen (rather than 
improve) these agents’ well-being. By way of illustration, individuals’ tendency 
to overestimate their future consumption can partly offset their propensity to 
under-save due to hyperbolic discounting, and paternalistic interventions that 
alleviate only agents’ overestimation bias tend to aggravate their under-saving 
bias (see e.g. Rizzo and Whitman, 2009a). 
 
As these considerations suggest, establishing that some bias observed in real-
life situations should be corrected typically requires choice architects to 
determine what biases affect the targeted agents, these biases’ impact on agents’ 
behaviour, and the (cognitive, economic, motivational) costs involved in 
correcting such biases. Unfortunately, most studies control for the impact of 
only one or a few biases and limitations at a time (see e.g. Kagan, 2012, ch.1). 
Therefore, those studies’ results rarely enable the new paternalists to anticipate 
the welfare implications of paternalistic interference in situations where a 
number of biases and limitations influence agents’ behaviour simultaneously. 
To put it differently, more detailed evidence about the aetiology and the 
interactions of individuals’ biases and limitations is needed to bridge the gap 
between the results obtained in controlled experimental settings and the new 
paternalists’ claims concerning the welfare implications of their interventions. 
 
(3) Suppose that the new paternalists could obtain accurate information 
concerning the short-term impact that specific biases and limitations have on 
agents’ behaviour. Assume further that the new paternalists were able to 
calibrate their interventions for the interactions between these biases and 
limitations. Even this may not enable the new paternalists to design and 
implement welfare-enhancing paternalistic interventions. Doing so, in fact, 
would often require the new paternalists to anticipate how responsive agents’ 
biases and limitations will be to paternalistic interference. Unfortunately, the 
responsiveness of several biases and limitations varies across time, agents and 
types of intervention in ways that are hard to quantify accurately (see e.g. 
Weinstein and Klein, 2002, on the resistance of personal risk perceptions to 
debiasing measures). Moreover, various paternalistic interventions have only 
short-term and context-dependent effects on agents’ behaviour (see e.g. Stijn et 
al., 2010, on the impact of various traveller advisory systems). These 
complications do not prevent the new paternalists from providing approximate 
estimates of the welfare implications of particular interventions. Nonetheless, 
they considerably constrain the generalizability of the short-term results of 
paternalistic interventions targeting small population segments to longer time 
spans and wider subsets of the population (see e.g. Bonell et al., 2011, on 
paternalistic interventions in the health care system).  
 
These generalizability concerns exacerbate when one considers that several 
types of interference championed by the new paternalists have been shown to 
backfire against their proponents’ declared policy aims. To see this, take again 
‘save more tomorrow’ plans, which aim to increase employees’ savings for 
retirement by changing their default options in retirement saving decisions. The 
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hitherto implemented plans frequently tend to reduce (rather than increase) the 
targeted agents’ retirement savings by inducing these agents to stick to default 
contributions that are lower than those agents’ contributions under opt-in plans. 
For instance, as documented by Bubb and Pildes (2014), major 401(k) plans 
administrators have reported massive increases in the fraction of administered 
401(k) plans and simultaneous decreases in both the median and the average 
total contribution rate of eligible employees. That is to say, pace leading new 
paternalists, too many and overly speculative inferential steps are required to 
accurately estimate the long-term responsiveness of agents’ biases and 
limitations across agents and types of intervention. 
 
(4) Individuals adopt several methods to alleviate the impact of specific biases 
and limitations on their own behaviour. Employed self-regulative methods 
range from self-imposed commitments to the voluntary submission to social 
controls and the advice of experts (see e.g. Trope and Fishbach, 2000). To be 
sure, individuals often lack proper incentives to de-bias and may fail to 
implement effective debiasing measures. Even so, self-regulative efforts can 
powerfully shape behaviour across several domains (see e.g. Baumeister and 
Vohs, 2004). For this reason, the new paternalists must accurately estimate the 
effects of individuals’ self-regulative efforts in calibrating their interventions. 
Regrettably, several factors hamper this calibration task. To give one example, 
individuals differ in their propensity to self-regulation (see e.g. Carver and 
Scheier, 1998) and adopt dissimilar self-regulative methods whose efficacy 
varies across time and situations (see e.g. Bogg and Roberts, 2004). Moreover, 
the new paternalists frequently lack the means to ascertain to what extent 
observed behaviour is shaped by agents’ self-regulative efforts. This, combined 
with the substitutability effects holding both between self-regulation at different 
times (see e.g. Baumeister et al., 1988) and between self-regulation and 
externally imposed controls (see e.g. Fishbach and Trope, 2005), often renders 
the estimation of the welfare implications of paternalistic interference 
prohibitively complicated (see e.g. the illustration regarding optimal sin taxes in 
point 1 above). 
 
In light of all these concerns, a new paternalist may concede that the NCP faces 
significant epistemic and evidential challenges. At the same time, she may rebut 
that principled opposition to paternalism is “a literal nonstarter” on the alleged 
ground that choice architects cannot avoid providing defaults to the targeted 
agents and that there are no viable alternatives to paternalistic interference 
(Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, 1165; see also Sunstein, 2013a). This rebuttal does 
not insulate the NCP from the aforementioned epistemic and evidential 
challenges. For clearly, it is one thing to contend that choice architects typically 
make decisions (e.g. what information to provide and how to frame it) that 
influence agents’ behaviour. It is quite another thing to allege that any such 
influence is bound to be paternalistic. To put it differently, the new paternalists’ 
claims regarding the purported unavoidability of paternalistic interference seem 
to presuppose an implausibly broad conceptualization of paternalism. 
 
A proponent of the NCP may acknowledge that the new paternalists often lack 
the evidence to establish what welfare implications paternalistic interference 
has for any particular agent. At the same time, she may object that the new 
paternalists can estimate the welfare implications of paternalistic interference 
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for distinct types of agents on the basis of assumptions concerning this 
interference’s impact on the behaviour of such agents (see e.g. Sunstein, 2015). 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the new paternalists can neatly separate 
distinct types of agents (e.g. risk prone and risk averse agents) in terms of the 
behavioural impact some interference has on these agents. Assume further that 
the new paternalists can identify precisely which of their target agents belong to 
each behavioural type. Substantiating the NCP would require the new 
paternalists to establish systematic correspondences between the predicted 
behavioural impact and the putative welfare implications of interference for the 
targeted agents. Unfortunately, the alleged fact that the new paternalists are able 
to categorize their target agents into distinct behavioural types falls short of 
implying that they can also establish what welfare implications their 
interference has for such agents. For a given interference may simultaneously 
have a similar impact on the behaviour of some set of agents, and yet have 
dissimilar welfare implications for each of these agents. In fact, the concerns 
explicated in points 1-4 above provide compelling reasons to think that the new 
paternalists’ interventions usually have dissimilar welfare implications for 
distinct individuals of the same behavioural types. 
 
A new paternalist may further attempt to defend the NCP by pointing to wider 
distributive considerations. One such defence (see e.g. Guala and Mittone, 
2015, and Trout, 2009, ch.4-6) goes as follows. Paternalistic interventions are 
routinely designed to redress injustice (e.g. undeserved imbalances due to 
genetic inheritance) and reduce the welfare losses that some agents’ activities 
impose on third parties (e.g. think of compulsory health insurance schemes 
aimed at contrasting individuals’ moral hazard). This does not per se render 
these paternalistic interventions justified. However, it forces anti-paternalists to 
specify what violations of agents’ autonomy and consent would have to be 
present to license the claim that those interventions are unjustifiable. Now, 
distributive considerations may occasionally bear in favour of paternalistic 
interference. Nonetheless, there are at least three reasons to doubt that these 
considerations yield significant support to the NCP. First, there is no principled 
reason to expect that paternalistic interventions prevalently redress (rather than 
exacerbate) injustice and reduce (rather than increase) the welfare losses that 
their target agents’ activities impose on third parties. Second, choice architects 
frequently have strong incentives to make decisions that promote their own 
interests (or the interests of third parties such as private firms) at the expense of 
their target agents (see e.g. Klick and Mitchell, 2006, and Willis, 2013, for 
illustrations). And third, choice architects can often design non-paternalistic 
interventions that redress injustice and reduce welfare losses without violating 
agents’ autonomy or consent (see e.g. Anderson, 2010, on various attempts to 
solve collective action problems by engaging individuals in interpersonal 
deliberation rather than subjecting them to paternalistic interference). 
 
At this stage, a new paternalist may rebut that the merits of the NCP should be 
judged on a case-by-case basis (see e.g. Sunstein, 2013b), and that choice 
architects should implement only those paternalistic interventions that meet the 
proffered justificatory challenges (see e.g. Sunstein, 2015, for a reply to some 
autonomy-related challenges). This rebuttal qualifies former calls for 
paternalistic interference, but provides rather limited support to the NCP. For in 
primis, confining the NCP’s applicability to specific cases constitutes a 
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significant downplaying of the new paternalists’ original ambition to 
systematically influence policy agendas across a variety of domains (see e.g. 
Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, ch.16-19). And second, the justificatory challenges 
articulated in this paper target not just a few selected instances of paternalistic 
interference, but also paradigmatic types of interference championed by many 
new paternalists. In this respect, it would be of little import to appeal to collect 
more findings about the aetiology and the impact of specific decision biases to 
identify additional ways to enhance agents’ well-being (see e.g. Trout, 2005). 
Indeed, these appeals could even backfire against the new paternalists. For such 
findings may provide choice architects with more effective means to improve 
agents’ well-being without having to implement any paternalistic interference, 
and may enable agents themselves to adopt superior forms of self-regulation, 
thereby reducing the putative need for any welfare-enhancing interference (see 
e.g. Gigerenzer, 2015, on how improving individuals’ statistical skills enables 
them to contrast framing manipulations; see also Voorhoeve, 2013, on how 
behavioural and psychological findings increase agents’ ability to enhance their 
own well-being through pre-commitment strategies). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The new paternalists maintain that the evidence collected in distinct decision 
sciences enables them to design and implement paternalistic interventions that 
address traditional anti-paternalistic objections and reliably enhance the well-
being of their target agents. This new case for paternalism supplements 
previous calls in favour of paternalism with a wide array of behavioural and 
neuro-psychological findings. However, it justifies a much narrower range of 
paternalistic interventions than the new paternalists allege. Furthermore, the 
new paternalists’ attempts to show that the paternalistic interventions they 
advocate are justified face severe and hitherto unaddressed justificatory 
challenges. In this article, I articulated and defended three such challenges in 
turn. More specifically, the argument from conceptual ambiguity documents the 
new paternalists’ need to provide more precise and plausible criteria for 
evaluating the welfare implications of their interventions. The argument from 
limited overlap challenges the new paternalists to demonstrate that the 
interventions they advocate reliably enhance the well-being of their target 
agents without involving morally objectionable violations of these agents’ 
autonomy or consent. The argument from constrained epistemic access 
illustrates that the new paternalists typically lack the information required to 
design and implement welfare-enhancing paternalistic interventions. These 
three arguments do not license all-encompassing opposition to paternalism. 
Still, taken together, they cast serious doubts on the new paternalists’ claim that 
recent findings from the decision sciences provide convincing reasons for 
paternalistic interference. 
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